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TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER GOVERNANCE IN THE FACE  
OF UNCERTAINTY: RESILIENCE THEORY AND THE  
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 
 
Barbara Cosens* 
 
University of Idaho College of Law, Waters of the West1 
 
To come to terms with the Columbia, we need to come to terms with it as 
a whole, as an organic machine, not only as a reflection of our own 
social divisions but as the site in which these divisions play out. If the 
conversation is not about fish and justice, about electricity and ways of 
life, about production and nature, about beauty as well as efficiency, and 
about how these things are inseparable in our own tangled lives, then we 
have not come to terms with our history on this river.  
Richard White2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Political boundaries are drawn without consideration of river basin 
boundaries, as illustrated by the fact that 263 surface water resources cross 
international boundaries.3 Over the next decade, several contributing factors could 
trigger rapid change and social and economic instability in these international 
watersheds, placing greater demands on competing water interests and a greater 
need to cooperate across jurisdictional boundaries. These contributing factors 
include: climate change; continued population growth; a threatened and 
deteriorating ecosystem; demand for non-fossil fuel energy; and aging 
                                                            
* © 2010 Barbara Cosens, Professor, University of Idaho, College of Law and co-principal 
investigator on the Waters of the West Initiative; former Assistant Professor, Environmental Studies 
Program, San Francisco State University; former mediator for the Walker River basin; former legal 
counsel, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission; lead counsel on negotiations to 
settle the reserved water rights of the Fort Belknap Reservation, the Chippewa Cree of the Rocky 
Boy’s Reservation, the National Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in Montana. 
LL.M., Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College; J.D., University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law; M.S. Geology, University of Washington; B.S. Geology, University of 
California, Davis. 
1 Waters of the West is an interdisciplinary graduate and research program offering M.S. and 
Ph.D. degrees in three tracks: Law, Policy and Management; Science and Management; and 
Engineering and Science. A concurrent J.D. degree may be obtained with either degree in any track. 
Over 50 faculty members from six colleges participate. The initiative allowed the University of Idaho 
College of Law to sufficiently expand its faculty in the area of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Law to develop an emphasis area in addition to the concurrent degree offering. 
2 RICHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER 113 
(1995). 
3 Oregon State University, Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation, 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/ 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942877
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infrastructure. Uncertainty in these factors challenges traditional approaches to 
governance of transboundary water resources. These approaches also rely on the 
certainty that historic data concerning water supply, demand, values, and 
ecosystem health can be used to predict the future. In addition, these traditional 
approaches protect sovereignty through clear rules for dividing resources rather 
than flexibility to adapt to change and foster system resilience. 
Resilience as applied to ecological systems addresses the ability of the system 
to continue to provide, or return to a state in which it will provide, a full range of 
ecosystem services in the face of change.4 When applied to the coupled human-
ecological system (i.e. a social-ecological system), it provides an umbrella theory 
for integration of concepts of natural resource management with ecological 
response to achieve sustainability.5 Achieving the goal of sustainability in a river 
basin is complicated by uncertainty in the drivers of change and the fragmentation 
of jurisdictions. Research to translate resilience theory into specific administrative 
actions may provide a road map to improving our ability to foster sustainability in 
our response to change in transboundary river basins. 
This research is an outgrowth of the first University of Idaho College of Law 
Natural Resources and Environment Symposium (“the Symposium”) focused on 
the issue of transboundary water governance in the face of uncertainty.6 The 
Symposium used the natural laboratory of the Columbia Basin, shared by the 
United States and Canada, as a focal point for discussion. Joint operation of the 
river for the purposes of hydropower production and flood control is governed by a 
1964 treaty (“the Treaty”). Certain flood control provisions of the Treaty expire in 
2024, and either country must provide ten years’ notice should it seek to terminate 
the Treaty. Thus efforts are underway in the basin to predict changes and to 
understand whether those changes warrant Treaty modification. The degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the drivers of change complicates efforts to predict and 
address changes. 
With the University of Idaho College of Law and Waters of the West Program 
as the lead organizer, the Symposium was developed in collaboration with 
researchers from Oregon State University, University of Montana, University of 
British Columbia, and Washington State University. Representatives of the first 
                                                            
4 See, e.g., BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS 
AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD (2006). 
5 See, e.g., Brian Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-
Ecological Systems, 9(2):5 ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 2 (2004), available at http://www.ecologyand 
society.org/vol9/iss2/art5 (PDF link at top of page) (“Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure, identity, and feedbacks . . .”). 
6 Papers presented at the Symposium are currently in draft form and not available for 
circulation. The Universities Consortium will be organizing these papers into a book to be published 
by the Oregon State University Press. In addition, the Symposium was conducted under the Chatham 
House Rules which require participants to avoid attribution of statements made during the 
Symposium. This paper will be careful to cite Symposium sources for factual information and ideas 
while following the Rules in avoiding attribution of statements of political position. 
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four of these universities and the University of Washington have joined to form the 
Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance (“the Consortium”).7  
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I introduces and reviews some of the 
relevant work on the concept of resilience in governance; Part II  uses information 
from the Symposium to describe the Columbia River and the 1964 Columbia River 
Treaty; Part III discusses changes since 1964 and the anticipated drivers of change;  
and Part IV concludes by applying the concept of resilience to the Columbia River 
Basin and laying the foundation for the next step in the research being pursued at 
the University of Idaho. This work includes developing models of administrative 
law that are integrated with the Consortium’s research around the concept of 
resilience. These models could be applied in the Columbia Basin and other 
transboundary and multi-jurisdictional efforts at river governance. 
 
I.  COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND RESILIENCE THEORY 
 
The concept of resilience made its appearance in the study of ecological 
systems in the work of C.S. Holling in 1973.8 As applied to ecological systems, 
“[r]esilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while 
undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, 
identity, and feedbacks . . . .”9 The theory is the outgrowth of interdisciplinary 
inquiry made necessary by the growing recognition of complexity.10 This part 
strives to place the concept of complex systems within a context relevant to the 
non-scientist11 then draws on resilience theory literature to explain why complexity 
requires a new approach to management. This part concludes with a discussion of 
resilience theory and how it informs governance of human-ecological interaction. 
To begin, it is useful to understand how science disciplines grapple with, or 
fail to grapple with, complexity. The traditional disciplinary silos of hard science 
begin by assuming complexity is not a factor. Drawing from the author’s former 
career in geochemistry, the laws of thermodynamics predict that chemical systems 
will conserve energy and tend toward increasing disorder.12 When mixed together, 
                                                            
7 The Consortium includes the following representatives from each university: University of 
Idaho: Barbara Cosens; Oregon State University: Aaron Wolf and Lynette de Silva; University of 
Montana: Matthew McKinney; University of British Columbia: Richard Paisley; University of 
Washington: Craig Thomas.  
8 C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, in 4 ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
ECOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS 1, 1-24 (1973).  
9 Walker et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
10 See, e.g., M. M. WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER 
AND CHAOS (1992). 
11 The author provided a similar explanation in an article advocating changes to the federal 
court system to accommodate the complexity of the law-science interface in resolving natural 
resource and environmental disputes and will draw on that explanation here. See generally Barbara 
Cosens, Resolving Conflict in Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solutions for the Law-Science 
Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 257 (2008). 
12 That energy can be converted from one form to another, but cannot be created or lost, i.e. is 
conserved, is the First law of thermodynamics. See generally, e.g., N.W. TSCHOEGAL, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF EQUILIBRIUM AND STEADY-STATE THERMODYNAMICS (2000). That the entropy, or 
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chemicals will form new compounds in a lower energy state. In what is referred to 
by physical chemists as an “ideal system,” all things achieve equilibrium: a final 
state with the lowest possible energy.13 Chemists can develop mathematical 
equations to predict the results of reactions between different chemical 
combinations by assuming the behavior of an ideal system, and the product can be 
shown to be repeatable in controlled experiments. This is the nature of the hard 
sciences; outcomes can be predicted by simple rules reflected in mathematical 
equations.14 Experiments in controlled environments are replicable.  
Within the vast field and number of disciplines we thus refer to as “science,” 
some individuals have sought a unifying theory which will allow for predictability 
in all systems.15 For example, E.O. Wilson writes of the inception of this effort, 
stating: 
                                                            
disorder, of a system will increase over time if no energy is added, is the second law of 
thermodynamics. Id.  
13 See, e.g., id.  
14 For another discussion of the differences between hard and soft sciences by a legal scholar, 
see David E. Adelman, The Art of the Unsolvable: Locating the Vital Center of Science for 
Environmental Law and Policy, in LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE OF LAW, FORUM ON LAW SCIENCE, & 
THE ENVIRONMENT: A MEETING OF THE MINDS (2007)  (draft paper Apr. 4, 2007), available at 
http://legacy.lclark.edu/dept/elaw/objects/Adelman_LC_Art_Unsolvable_040207.pdf. 
 
As prefigured above, the simple answer is that the power of science depends on the 
nature of the problem and the strength of the tools available to analyze it. Good science 
ranges from the highly precise and accurate methods found in the hard sciences (e.g., 
Newtonian physics) to heuristic models that expose general patterns in complex systems 
(e.g., ecology). Science is thus inherently pluralistic, as the different scientific disciplines 
attest, and a unitary conception of environmental science is neither a desirable end nor a 
viable goal. 
 
(internal citations omitted).  Id. at 2. See also Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural 
Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 298 (2005) 
 
With the right equipment, the speed of light, the pull of gravity, and the atomic weight of 
hydrogen, for instance, can all be measured to a very high degree of both precision and 
accuracy. Biological phenomena, even at the level of a single organism, are more 
complicated, more variable, and therefore inherently more difficult to obtain highly 
certain information about. Moving to the community or ecosystem level adds yet another 
level of variability. Unlike some physical scientists, conservation scientists often cannot, 
as a practical matter, test their hypotheses under closely controlled laboratory conditions. 
They must rely upon observations of the natural world which are both difficult to make 
and subject to a high degree of background variation in order to try to understand 
complex biological processes. Under those circumstances, while a very strong consensus 
may develop around the existence and general outline of general principles such as 
heredity or evolution, science may never produce certainty about the extent, or even the 
existence, of causal relationships between ecosystem decline and specific human 
activities. 
 
Id. 
15 See, e.g., E.O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 15 (1999). “Consilience,” 
as used by Wilson, describes a unified theory across the natural and social sciences and, in his words, 
means “[l]iterally a ‘jumping together’ of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory 
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[t]he dream of intellectual unity first came to full flower in the 
original Enlightenment, an Icarian flight of the mind that spanned the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A vision of secular knowledge in 
the service of human rights and human progress, it was the West’s 
greatest contribution to civilization. It launched the modern era for the 
whole world; we are all its legatees. Then it failed.16 
 
Modern scholars engaged in the study of complex systems attribute this failure to 
the dismissal of complexity as a key component of the system.17 
In contrast to the search for unity, the vast majority of scientists since the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have sought replicable and predictable 
behavior in systems through reductionism—breaking those systems into their 
component parts.18 Scientists coming from a disciplinary world in which 
reductionism prevails often attempt to describe and predict behavior in more 
complex systems through synthesis.19 Thus to understand an organism, it is built 
from the cell up.20 To understand the interaction between the human and natural 
world, we would study each in isolation, then attempt to bring those separate 
understandings to bear on resolution of a single environmental problem. As Wilson 
points out, “[t]he greatest obstacle to consilience by synthesis . . . is the 
exponential increase in complexity encountered during the upward progress 
through levels of organization.”21 The advent of high speed computing has made it 
easier to describe complex systems with multiple variables, but as any modeler of 
climate change knows, the whole is not merely the sum of the parts. 
In addition to the complexity resulting from the sheer number of variables in a 
natural system, complexity is the result of interaction among those variables. 
Predictions of system behavior through synthesis from a reductionist 
understanding of the components built on the assumption of ideal behavior often 
do not match empirical observations. This is because ideal behavior assumes no 
interaction between components. In other words, the assumption of the reductionist 
viewpoint is that the behavior observed in isolation will remain unchanged in the 
face of greater complexity. Yet those who use empirical methods to study natural 
systems have found that it is often the interactions among components that define 
                                                            
across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation” (internal citations omitted). Id. at 
8. 
16 Id. at 15. 
17 See, e.g., Sharachchandra Lélé & Richard B. Norgaard, Practicing Interdisciplinarity, 55:11 
BIOSCIENCE 967, 974 (2005) (“Disagreements within the social sciences, however, are therefore 
extremely deep-rooted, in part because of a mistaken belief (left over from 19th-century physics) that 
social phenomena ought to be explained, or largely explained, by a few universal principles.”). 
18 WILSON, supra note 15, at 68. 
19 Id. at 71. 
20 Id. at 68. 
21 Id. at 91. 
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the system. This is the very premise of the field of ecology.22 This is why the trend 
in universities is toward increasing efforts at interdisciplinary research.23 
To the scientist who studies natural systems—for example, the geologist, the 
geochemist, the ecologist, and the social scientist—the simple addition of system 
parts cannot explain empirical observations. Natural systems display states that are 
repeated over and over again in different settings yet cannot be predicted by the 
laws derived from observation of individual components of the system and the 
assumption of ideality. Examples range from the uniform relation between the 
geometry of pool/riffle sequences and meanders and the width of a river,24 to the 
repeated occurrence of so-called “metastable” mineral sequences in geothermal 
systems25 and ore bodies,26 to life.27 In the context of an ecological system, 
although the system may constantly move toward some (ever changing) 
equilibrium state, the dynamics of the system mean that equilibrium state will 
never be realized.28 Instead, the observation that ecological systems evolve in a 
cyclical manner with key organizing processes resulting in the repetition of certain 
states, and thus the continuation of ecosystem services, has led to the concept of 
the adaptive cycle.29 As a result, although natural systems can be described and 
compared with accuracy, predictability of future behavior is far more uncertain. 
                                                            
22 See J. DAVID ALLEN, STREAM ECOLOGY: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF RUNNING WATER 
(1995). 
23 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, AND INSTITUTE 
OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FACILITATING INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH, 32-33, 
(2005) (“If science and engineering deal with extremely complex systems, the same is true for studies 
of human society. How human societies evolve, make decisions, interact, and solve problems are all 
matters that call for diverse insights. Very fundamental questions are inherently complex.”). 
24 See Luna B. Leopold, Water Surface Topography in River Channels, in GRAVEL-BED 
RIVERS, 359-387 (R.D. Hay, J.C. Bathurst & C.R. Thorne eds., 1982), available at 
http://eps.berkeley.edu/people/lunaleopold/(137%20Images)%20Water%20Surface%20Topography
%20in%20River%20Channels%20and%20Implications%20for%20Meander%20Development.pdf.  
25 See, e.g., Shang J. Yao & Bruno J. Zwolinski, Studies on Rates of Nonequilibrium Processes, 
in ADVANCES IN CHEMICAL PHYSICS: CHEMICAL DYNAMICS: PAPERS IN HONOR OF HENRY EYRING, 
Vol. 21, Part 2, 91 (2007), available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/bookhome/114180975/ProductInformation.html; Barbara (Cosens) Gallinatti, Initiation and 
Collapse of Active Circulation in a Hydrothermal System at the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, 23ºN, 89:B5 
JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 3275 (1984). 
26 See, e.g., P.B. Redmond, M.T. Einaudi, E.E. Inan, M.R. Landtwing, & C.A. Heinrich, 
Copper Deposition By Fluid Cooling In Intrusion-Centered Systems: New Insights from the Bingham 
Porphyry Ore Deposit, 32:3 UTAH GEOLOGY 217-220 (2004); G.H. Brimhall, Early Fracture-
Controlled Disseminated Mineralization at Butte, Montana, 72 ECON. GEOL. 37-59 (1977). 
27 See generally WILSON, supra note 15. 
28 WALKER & SALT, supra note 4, at 54 (“[t]he concept of a ‘stable’ or equilibrium state is a bit 
misleading – the system is always tending toward the current stable state, but changing conditions 
mean the end point (or configuration of the basin of attraction) is constantly changing, thus 
equilibrium is never achieved.”). 
29 See, e.g., Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in 
PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 25-62 (Lance H. 
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). 
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This leads to softer answers and greater disagreement within the discipline on 
exactly what those answers should be.30 This is the nature of complexity. 
Consider a river. Mathematical descriptions of fluid flow in an ideal system 
assume no friction. Yet anyone who has run a river knows that it is the edge that 
defines the flow: the turbulence around a boulder or fallen log; the riffles over a 
gravel bed; the eddy on the inside of a curve. Indeed, friction, the component 
missing in ideal fluid flow, defines a river. Thus, mathematical modeling of river 
flow must include a term for the interaction between the water and the river bed, 
i.e. friction.31 The sediment load of a river adds even greater complexity to 
defining river flow and channel morphology, requiring the addition of yet another 
disciplinary component.32 The study of a river becomes even more complex when 
its development is viewed in a longer timeframe in which tectonics may play a role 
in shaping its morphology.33 Key to the concept of the adaptive cycle referred to 
above, is the observation that it occurs at multiple scales and that simple scaling up 
from one level to another will not accurately describe the system.34 Thus, an 
accurate description of an ecological system must also take into account 
interactions at multiple scales on multiple timeframes and between different 
scales.35 Adding the human component to the system further increases the 
complexity. No one who has observed the channelization, damming, and 
development of our great rivers can ignore either the impact of human intervention 
or our inability to fully appreciate the full measure of that impact at the time the 
actions were taken.36 
From the author’s own research, fossil hydrothermal systems provide another 
example. At moderate temperatures, the flow of fluid through fractures in rock will 
interact to alter the mineral composition of the rock. In an ideal system, the 
reactions will go to a state of equilibrium between the water and rock, and the 
resulting mineral assemblage is predictable.37 But in a real system, fluid flow is 
often faster than the rate of chemical exchange between rock and water, thus the 
                                                            
30 See also Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural 
Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (additional discussion of this 
issue by a legal scholar with a biology background) (“First, as sensible ecologists have constantly 
warned, ecology and the related biological sciences will never reach the precision and elegance of 
physics and mathematics.”). 
31 The term for friction is found in the St. Venant equations used to handle river flow. ADEMAR-
JEAN-CLAUDE BARRÉ DE SAINT-VENANT, THÉORIE DU MOUVEMENT NON-PERMANENT DES EAUX AVEC 
APPLICATION AUX CRUES DES RIVIÈRES ET À L'INTRODUCTION DES MARÉES DANS LEUR LIT 73 (1871). 
32 See, e.g., W.E. Dietrich, P.A. Nelson, E. Yager, J.G. Venditti, M.P. Lamb, & L. Collins, 
Sediment Patches, Sediment Supply and Channel Morphology, in RIVER, COASTAL AND ESTUARINE: 
MORPHODYNAMICS 79-90 (G. Parker & M.H. Garcia eds., 2006). 
33 See, e.g., Chris Paola et al., Toward a Unified Science of the Earth's Surface: Opportunities 
for Synthesis Among Hydrology, Geomorphology, Geochemistry, and Ecology, 42 WATER 
RESOURCES. RESEARCH, W03S10 doi:10.1029/2005WR004336 (2006), available at 
http://www.agu.org/journals/wr/wr0603/2005WR004336/. 
34 Gunderson & Holling, supra note 29, at 26. 
35 Id.  
36 See, e.g., JEFFREY MOUNT, CALIFORNIA RIVERS AND STREAMS (1995); W.E. Dietrich & J.T. 
Perron, The Search for a Topographic Signature of Life, 439 NATURE 411, 411- 419 (2006). 
37 See, e.g., Gallinatti, supra note 25, at 3284. 
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system will not have time to achieve equilibrium.38 The addition of kinetic 
information, i.e. information on the rate at which a particular reaction at a 
particular temperature will occur, to a model of water-rock interaction vastly 
improves the predictability of the intermediate or “metastable” results.39 However, 
simply adding kinetic information to a model built from a reductionist 
understanding of the system will not predict the repeated occurrence of the same 
metastable minerals observed over and over again in different natural systems that 
could not possibly have had the exact same rate of fluid flow. Could it be that 
some other factor defined by the very nature of the interaction between rock and 
moving water determines the outcome?40 It is the possibility, in fact the belief by 
some, that interactions define natural systems, which has led to the development of 
new disciplines, such as ecology, at the point of interaction, rather than disciplines 
based on synthesis within the hard sciences.  
These examples of complexity and non-ideal behavior at the intersection 
between system components should not be unfamiliar to the reader who studies the 
law. The very need for law rests on the complexity of human interaction. A single 
human alone on an island needs no law. It is the determination of the rights of one 
human being or group relative to those of another that gives rise to civil law. 
Rarely are the facts of a legal dispute identical to one that has already been 
decided, yet often lawyers can predict the outcome of a new case based on the 
similarity of key controlling features to those of prior cases. The law provides this 
                                                            
38 Id. at 3284-3288. 
39 See, e.g., N. Shikazona, Water-Rock Interaction and Mass Transfer in Hydrothermal 
Systems: Kinetics, Fluid Flow, and Mixing Model, in WATER DYNAMICS: 3RD INTERNATIONAL 
WORKSHOP ON WATER DYNAMICS, 125-128 (2006), available at http://scitation.aip.org/proceedings/ 
confproceed/833.jsp/Table of Contents/Full Text.  
40 This has also been referred to as a problem of scale, as David Adelman notes: 
 
Simon Levin, an ecological modeler and theorist, describes this approach with 
characteristic clarity: 
 
This is the principal technique of scientific inquiry: by changing the scale of 
description, we move from unpredictable, unrepeatable individual cases to 
collections of cases whose behavior is regular enough to allow 
generalizations to be made. In so doing, we trade off the loss of detail or 
heterogeneity within a group for the gain of predictability; we thereby extract 
and abstract those fine-scale features that have relevance for the phenomena 
observed on other scales. 
 
. . . One implication of this approach is that not all levels of abstraction for analyzing a 
problem are created equal. Just as it would be foolish to try to study the behavior of a gas 
by attempting to follow the motion of every single gas molecule, so too may it be futile to 
attempt to understand biodiversity by tracking populations of individual species. 
Consideration of scale matters for basic scientific understanding and for very practical 
problems of effective environmental management. In fact, the two are closely linked 
because identification of strong associations (i.e. patterns) through basic scientific work 
makes environmental management possible.  
 
Adelman, supra note 14, at 8 (internal citations omitted). 
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degree of certainty and predictability as a result of social contract, not natural law. 
Yet it nevertheless mimics the behavior of complex natural systems in which 
multiple variables must be sorted and weighed to determine their importance to the 
future activity of the system.  
Resilience theory provides a framework for understanding complexity within 
an ecological system and for developing governance to enhance the resilience, and 
thus sustainability, of the social-ecological system. When applied to ecological 
systems without a human component, resilience theory focuses on both the 
capacity of the system to return to its prior level of self-organization following a 
disturbance,41 and the degree to which that capacity is influenced by or sensitive to 
changes at smaller and larger scales.42 When applied to social systems, resilience is 
the “ability of human communities to withstand and recover from stresses.”43 
Recently, scholars have recognized that application of the theory to social-
ecological systems has merit, but that the theory must be modified to account for 
the possibility that free-will in the social component can be used to enhance or 
reduce system resilience.44 Thus, Walker et al. describe this as the ability of 
humans to manage for resilience in the face of change through either adaptation or 
transformation of the system to another desirable state.45 Folke et al. describe both 
the social and ecological components as combined aspects of resilience.46 Both 
groups start from the assumption that a social-ecological system is not unlike an 
ecological system in having key controlling processes that result in self-
organization of the system.47 In this context, the ability of humans to choose can 
function to facilitate resilience or push a system toward a more rather than less 
resilient path, but the human intervention does not replace the self-organizing 
system. 
In contrast, Andries et al. find it awkward to apply the concept of resilience to 
a system that includes conscious management and design; they have adopted the 
term “robustness” to apply to social-ecological systems in which human design is 
the dominant factor.48 Consider that these differences in terminology can be 
thought to be on a spectrum—at one end we have the built environment, e.g. cities, 
                                                            
41 Referred to as the “latitude,” “resistance,” and “precariousness” of the system. See Walker et 
al., supra note 5, at 2-3. 
42 Id. See also Gunderson & Holling, supra note 29. 
43 Stockholm Resilience Center, Resilience Dictionary, http://www.stockholmresilience.org/ 
research/whatisresilience/resiliencedictionary.4.aeea46911a3127427980004355.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2010). 
44 Walker et al., supra note 5. See generally Carl Folke et al., Adaptive Governance of Social-
Ecological Systems, 30 ANNUAL REV. ENVIRON. RESOURCES. 441 (2005). For a simple and concise 
explanation of resilience theory and its application to real world systems, see generally WALKER & 
SALT, supra note 4. 
45 See Walker et al., supra note 5. 
46 Folke et al., supra note 44, at 443. 
47 C. S. Holling, Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological and Social Systems, 4 
ECOSYSTEMS 390, 391 (2001). 
48 See John M. Anderies et al., A Framework for Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from 
an Institutional Perspective, 9(1) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 18 (2004), available at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art18 (PDF link at top of page). 
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in which robustness might come from mimicking ecological processes in areas 
such as flood control, building design for water capture, water re-use, riparian area 
protection or restoration—to the other end of the spectrum, in which we have an 
ecological system functioning with human influence only at scales above or below 
it.  An example of this is the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, where external 
human activities influencing processes such as climate change or caribou migration 
will have impacts. In between, you might find the Columbia River, as Richard 
White calls it: “an organic machine.”49  
The Columbia River has aspects of both the highly designed environment 
including dams, diversions, hatcheries and development in the riparian corridor, 
but the river also has an ecological system that continues to function and adapt. If, 
as the possibility is discussed below in assessments of the health of the 
anadromous fish populations, the system has already lost its resilience as an 
ecological system, then we must either move toward robustness in design and 
accept that challenge, or determine how to move back toward a resilient system.50 
It is important to note that the choice of which approach to adopt is a reflection of 
culture and values, not science. 
In resilience literature, scholars use the term governance to describe the laws, 
policies, regulation, institutions and institutional structure involved in governing.51 
The term “adaptive management” has been used to describe a process of learning 
through monitoring ecosystem response to a particular action, followed by 
incremental change in the action based on what is learned.52 The concept of 
“adaptive governance” includes the process of feedback to a managing agency 
from monitoring the response of the ecosystem, but it also adds the collaboration 
and cooperation across different levels of government, non-governmental and 
individual action, and among agencies within the same level of government with 
overlapping authority.53 By viewing governance in a way that recognizes the social 
and ecological systems as linked, resilience can be enhanced both from the natural 
                                                            
49 See White, supra note 2. 
50 It should be noted that engineered solutions may never capture the full complexity of a 
natural system and that designs for robustness may be valuable only as a temporary state while the 
long term goal is returning function of the natural system. See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer & Lance 
Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not Always be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration 
from Glen Canyon and the Everglades 87 NEB. L. REV. 893 (2009). 
51 See, e.g., Folke et al., supra note 44, at 444 (“Governance is the structures and processes by 
which people in societies make decisions and share power.”); Dave Huitema et al., Adaptive Water 
Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-)Management from a 
Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda, 14(1) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 26, 2 
(2009), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art26/ (“[W]e take governance to 
mean ‘the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing.’ This 
includes both formal institutions, such as laws, official policies, and organizational structures, and 
informal institutions: the power relations and practices that have developed and the rules that are 
followed in practice.” (citation omitted)). 
52 See Folke et al., supra note 44. See also Huitema et al., supra note 51; Kai N. Lee, 
Appraising Adaptive Management, 3(2) CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 3 (1999), available at 
http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art3/. 
53 Folke et al., supra note 44, at 453. 
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adaptive capabilities of the ecological system and from the ability of the social 
system to respond to an ecological problem by seeking to restore the ecosystem. 54 
This view of governance involving ecological systems—as requiring 
approaches that recognize the complex feedback between the social and the 
ecological system  differs from the traditional approach to natural resource 
management that involves a one-way flow of management by the social system 
with services from the ecological system in return. Similar to the problems faced 
by the natural sciences discussed above, natural resources management suffers 
from the failure of synthesis to accurately represent the behavior of the system. 
The failure of management through “optimization” to retain the full range of 
ecosystem services is a key message of scholars working on the concept of 
resilience.55 Thus, Walker and Salt assert, 
 
. . . if there is one lesson to be taken from this book it is this: 
optimization (in the sense of maximizing efficiency through tight 
control) is a large part of the problem, not the solution . . . . When we 
aim to increase the efficiency of returns from some part of the system by 
trying to tightly control it, we usually do so at the cost of the system’s 
resilience. Other parts of the system begin to change in response to this 
new state of affairs—a part of the system, now constant, that used to vary 
in concert with others. A system with little resilience is vulnerable to 
being shifted over a threshold into a new regime of function and 
structure. And, as we’ve seen, this new regime is frequently one that 
doesn’t provide us with the goods and services we want. And, very 
importantly, it is not a space from which we can easily return.56 
 
Adaptive governance moves from a focus on efficiency and lack of overlap 
among jurisdictional authorities, to a focus on diversity, redundancy, and multiple 
levels of management that include a role for local knowledge and local action. The 
concept that overlap and diversity among jurisdictions with authority to manage 
the same ecological resource is preferable to hierarchical management with clear 
                                                            
54 See Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 50, at 897. Addressing environmental problems across 
multiple jurisdictions is under discussion by scholars looking through the lens of numerous 
theoretical constructs. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and 
Massive Problems in the Administrative State: Guidelines for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L.  REV. 1 
(forthcoming 2010) (earlier version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280896). This author 
prefers the language and nuances of the resilience literature because it ties directly to the coupled 
complexity of the social ecological system rather than viewing governance as a feature independent 
of the ecologic system it manages. See, e.g., Folke et al., supra note 44, at 443 (citing LINKING 
SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR 
BUILDING RESILIENCE (F. Berkes & C. Folke eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998)) (for use of “the 
term ‘social-ecological’ system to emphasize the integrated concept of humans in nature and to stress 
that the delineation between social and ecological systems is artificial and arbitrary. Research 
suggests that social-ecological systems have powerful reciprocal feedbacks and act as complex 
adaptive systems.”). 
55 Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 50. 
56 WALKER & SALT, supra note 4, at 141. 
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divisions in authority is referred to as “polycentric governance” in adaptive 
management scholarship,57 and “legal pluralism” in legal scholarship.58 In adaptive 
governance, it is important to have a mechanism for coordination that can work at 
the scale of the particular ecological system involved (e.g. the basin scale for a 
river system), but it is not as important to designate a single entity with authority at 
that scale. More importantly, designation of an entity with authority at the scale of 
the particular ecological system may serve as the mechanism for coordination at 
that scale, but it is not a replacement for diversity in governance at multiple 
scales.59 
In addition to a focus on institutional diversity, both the concept of 
polycentric governance and legal pluralism view local capacity building for 
purposes of self-governance as key to effective governance.60 Achieving this 
would not only require the infusion of education and resources at the local level, 
but local authority within the decision making network. Unlike the move for local 
control in past western U.S. efforts, such as the Sagebrush Rebellion and the 
county supremacy movement, which advocate total local control over local natural 
resource issues concerning federal land,61 polycentric governance would mean 
granting a larger voice and decision making power locally while retaining a 
network with state and federal government. Again, this redundancy in government, 
viewed as inefficient in the past, enhances the resilience of government to adapt to 
change. 
The rise in the expectation for public involvement in government decision 
making since the 1960s with respect to natural resources in the United States and 
other democratic nations, and the incorporation of this concept in the law, will be 
discussed in Part III. As will be discussed, adaptive governance requires more than 
                                                            
57 See Huitema et al., supra note 51, at 3 (providing an excellent literature review on the work 
in this area beginning in the 1960s which will not be replicated here). 
58 See generally LIQUID RELATIONS: CONTESTED WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL COMPLEXITY (Dik 
Roth, Rutgerd Boelens, & Margreet Zwarteveen eds., Rutgers University Press 2005). 
59 Huitema et al., supra note 51, at 11  
 
There is little empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the river-basin approach, 
either in its monocentric form (unitary river-basin authorities) or its polycentric form 
(collaboration at the basin scale), in the literature discussed here. Dinar et al. suggest that 
basin-level governance institutions are a necessary but insufficient condition for 
successful resource management, meaning that the absence of such institutions will lead 
to the failure of management but their presence does not necessarily lead to success. 
 
(internal citations omitted). 
60 Id. at 3. See also G.T. (Tom) Raadgever et al., Assessing Management Regimes in 
Transboundary River Basins: Do They Support Adaptive Management?, 13(1) ECOLOGY AND 
SOCIETY 14 (2008), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art14/; Susan S. 
Hanna, Institutions for Managing Resilient Salmon (Oncorhynchus Spp.) Ecosystems: The Role of 
Incentives and Transaction Costs, 13(2) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 35 (2008), available at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art35/.  
61 See, e.g., University of Nevada Reno Special Collections, A Guide to the Records of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion, Collection No. 85-04, available at http://www.knowledgecenter.unr.edu/spe 
coll/mss/85-04.html. 
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public comment. The phrase used in the literature is “meaningful public 
comment,”62 and refers both to a two way flow of information in which 
governmental agencies work not only to provide information from their own 
expertise, but to also incorporate local knowledge and work towards a greater role 
for public input in decision making.63 
Before turning to the Columbia River Basin, it is important to discuss some of 
the concerns identified with a polycentric approach to governance. These include 
the concern that redundancy leads to both loss of efficiency and accountability in 
decision making.64 Changes in administrative law can be useful in addressing both 
problems. Loss of efficiency presents both a political problem in selling the cost of 
redundancy in governance to the public and a problem with transaction costs 
associated with communication and coordination among diverse entities (the 
connect the dots problem currently at issue in homeland security). Redundancy 
costs can be offset by viewing the ecological system as providing a complete range 
of ecosystem services. Thus efficiency, when equated with optimization for a 
limited range of ecosystem services (e.g. hydropower and flood control), when 
viewed in the whole context of the social-ecological system, may prove to be the 
more costly approach. The problems associated with valuing ecosystem services 
are the subject of numerous articles and research efforts,65 and are beyond the 
scope of this Article except to note that the change in accounting to reflect the full 
range of ecosystem services is a necessary step in changing governance to facilitate 
resilience. Accountability, on the other hand, is an appropriate area of inquiry for 
those seeking solutions in the administrative law. It is crucial to the function of a 
democratic system and, therefore, will be one of the key focuses of development of 
models for administrative law to achieve resilience that will be the outgrowth of 
the second phase of this research. 
In their excellent review of the literature, Huitema et al. find no concrete 
evidence that polycentric governance is more flexible and less vulnerable (key 
goals for facilitation of resilience) than traditional, hierarchical forms of 
governance, but that numerous case studies do suggest the effectiveness of the 
polycentric approach for large-scale “common pool” resources.66 As a legal 
scholar, I do not find this lack of ability to monitor and provide quantitative proof 
of effectiveness as disturbing as my science colleagues might. The very nature of 
                                                            
62 MATTHEW MCKINNEY & WILLIAM HARMON, THE WESTERN CONFLUENCE: A GUIDE TO 
GOVERNING NATURAL RESOURCES 142 (2004). 
63 Id. 
64 Huitema et al., supra note 51, at 3. 
65 See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: CAPTURING THE TRUE 
VALUE OF NATURE’S NATURAL CAPITAL (2007), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices/ 
pdf/ecosystem-services.pdf. For more general discussions of ecosystem services, see J.B. Ruhl, The 
“Background Principles” of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services – Did Lucas Open Pandora’s 
Box? 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 525 (2007); SALLY COLLINS & ELIZABETH LARRY, U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE, CARING FOR OUR NATURAL ASSETS: AN ECOSYSTEM SERVICES PERSPECTIVE (2007), 
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices/pdf/collins_larry.pdf.  
66 Huitema et al., supra note 51, at 4. See also NANCY LANGSTON, WHERE LAND AND WATER 
MEET (2003) (providing a case study of the Mahleur basin in Oregon). 
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complexity in social-ecological systems and the fact that no two large-scale 
systems are exactly alike, nor is the same system identical at two different points in 
time, renders it impossible to make a controlled comparison of polycentric and 
hierarchical governance. Thus, in applying the concept of resilience to the 
Columbia River, I rely on case studies, conducted by myself and other scholars, to 
attempt to derive lessons for why a particular approach works or does not work and 
why it might or might not be applicable to the Columbia River Basin. 
 
II.  THE COLUMBIA RIVER AND THE 1964 TREATY 
 
The Columbia River Basin covers 259,500 square miles with 15% in Canada 
and the remainder in the United States.67 Portions of seven states, Washington, 
Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming, lie within the Columbia River 
basin. Although only 15% of the basin lies within the Canadian province of British 
Columbia, 38% of the average annual flow and 50% of the peak flow measured at 
The Dalles (located on the mainstem between Oregon and Washington) originates 
in Canada.68 In addition, due to the later runoff from snowpack, flow originating in 
Canada can be 50% of the late summer flow.69 To express runoff from the 
Columbia River basin in terms of its average annual flow of 200 million acre-feet 
at the mouth would be misleading. The year-to-year variability in unregulated peak 
flow is 1:34, compared to a mere 1:2 on the Saint Lawrence River or 1:25 on the 
Mississippi River.70 This variability translated to substantial storage need in the 
eyes of early twentieth-century boosters and engineers.71 
In 1805 when Lewis and Clark made their way down the Columbia River to 
Astoria, there were no dams. Salmon fisheries sustained the native population. 
Falls slowed upriver migration of salmon and provided excellent fishing locations. 
Each year thousands of Native Americans from numerous tribes gathered at 
locations such as Celilo Falls (now inundated by water behind The Dalles Dam) to 
fish and trade.72 Competition from commercial fishing and an influx of canneries 
began in 1866. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began transforming the 
Columbia River for navigation with locks at the Cascades as early as 1896, with 
                                                            
67 James Barton & Kelvin Ketchum, Columbia River Treaty: Managing for Uncertainty, in 
TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER GOVERNANCE IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 
[hereinafter “COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM”] (forthcoming 2010) (draft article at 1, on file with author). 
68 John Shurts, Rethinking the Columbia River Treaty, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 
(draft article at 7, on file with author). 
69 Alan Hamlet, The Role of Transboundary Agreements in the Columbia River Basin: An 
Integrated Assessment in the Context of Historic Development, Climate, and Evolving Water Policy, 
in CLIMATE AND WATER: TRANSBOUNDARY CHALLENGES IN THE AMERICAS 23 (H. Diaz & B. 
Morehouse eds., 2003). 
70 Id. 
71 See generally Paul W. Hirt & Adam M. Sowards, The Past and Future of the Columbia 
River, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft article at 6, on file with author).  
72 DAN LANDEEN & ALLEN PINKHAM, SALMON AND HIS PEOPLE, A NEZ PERCE NATURE GUIDE 1 
(1999). See also Paul Hirt, Developing a Plentiful Resource: Transboundary Rivers in the Pacific 
Northwest, in WATER, PLACE, & EQUITY 147, 155 (John M. Whiteley et al. eds., 2008) (noting that 
pre-European settlement salmon runs were estimated at 12-15 million salmon). 
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numerous dams to follow.73 Most dams in the U.S. portion of the river mainstem 
served to generate hydropower and aid navigation, but did not store substantial 
water.74 Exceptions to this run-of-the-river approach were the Grand Coulee Dam, 
a BOR facility, completed on the mainstem in 1942 for irrigation that permanently 
blocked salmon runs from reaching Canada and the Hungry Horse Dam completed 
on a tributary, the South Fork of the Flathead, in 1953.75 In 1948, even though the 
total flow was close to average, runoff occurred rapidly and peaked with a flood in 
May that destroyed the town of Vanport, Oregon with estimated flow of over 1 
million cubic feet per second (“cfs”),  (average peak flows are less than half that 
rate).76 At the time of the 1948 flood, total storage capacity on the Columbia was 
about 6% of the average annual flow.77 Compare this to the Colorado with a 
storage capacity of over four times its average annual flow or the Missouri with 
storage capacity over two times its average annual flow.78 The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers is, or at least was at the time, accustomed to addressing flood control 
through storage. The problem: the best remaining storage sites were in Canada. 
Even before the 1948 flood, the International Joint Commission formed by the 
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada, was directed 
to study the possibility of storage within Canada to provide flood control or power 
benefits to both countries.79 The Columbia River Treaty80 (“the Treaty” or “the 
Columbia River Treaty”) that would form the framework to accomplish this task 
was not adopted until 1964. Possibly the biggest obstacle to its completion was the 
fact that the three new dams contemplated would all be in British Columbia and 
the majority of the flood control and hydropower benefits would be in the United 
States.81 Between 1961 and 1964 negotiations between the federal government of 
Canada and the province of British Columbia led to a solution that would turn the 
operation and benefits under the Treaty over to the province and divide benefits 
between the U.S. and the province.82 The resulting solution has been held 
throughout the world as the pinnacle of international cooperation on freshwater 
sources.83 The Treaty would provide for three dams to be built in Canada: Mica, 
                                                            
73 WHITE, supra note 2, at 37. 
74 Shurts, supra note 68, at 7. 
75 Id.  
76 Barton & Ketchum, supra note 67, at 4. 
77 Anthony White, The Columbia River, Its Treaties and Operation, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, 
supra note 67 (draft article at 1, on file with author).  
78 Barton & Ketchum, supra note 67 (draft article at 4, on file with author). 
79 Jeremy Mouat, The Columbia Exchange: A Canadian Perspective on the Negotiation of the 
Columbia River Treaty, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft article at 1, on file with 
author); Shurts, supra note 68, at 6-7. 
80 Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America Relating to Cooperative 
Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin (“Columbia River Treaty”), U.S.-
Can., Jan. 17, 1961 available at http://www.ccrh.org/comm/river/docs/cotreaty.htm [hereinafter 
Columbia River Treaty]. 
81 Mouat, supra note 79, at 9; Shurts, supra note 68, at 6-7. 
82 Mouat, supra note 79, at 9-15; Shurts, supra note 68, at 7-8; Hirt & Sowards, supra note 71, 
at 17. 
83 Barton & Ketchum, supra note 67, at 1. 
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Duncan, and Keenleyside; a payment of $65 million from the United States to 
Canada for flood control; and a 50/50 division of the benefit of the additional 
hydropower generated in the United States due to release from the three new dams 
with the Canadian share referred to as the “Canadian Entitlement.”84 In addition, 
the Treaty allowed the United States to build Libby Dam on the Kootenai River, 
which would back water into Canada.85 Finally, the Treaty provided for 
appointment of operating entities by the United States and British Columbia. The 
U.S. selected the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power 
Administration.86 British Columbia selected BC Hydro.87 
One further complication would need to be addressed before the Treaty could 
be completed. In 1964 the Pacific Northwest did not require the amount of power 
the new projects would generate. This was solved when Congress authorized 
construction of the Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest Intertie allowing sale of 
power to utilities in the southwestern United States, with a preference for sale to 
northwest utilities.88 Thirty-year contracts for sale of hydropower to the 
southwestern United States were entered with a payment to Canada of $254 
million, enough to cover dam construction.89 Although this payment was based on 
the estimated present value of the anticipated power sales, it would not come close 
to the actual value that would have been realized on renewable contracts over the 
same thirty year period.90 Choosing certainty, even in the face of potential gain 
through a more flexible relationship, is a common theme in multi-jurisdictional 
agreements and will be discussed further in the application of resilience concepts 
to the Columbia River Basin in Part IV. 
The Treaty contains no automatic termination date or renegotiation clause and 
2024 is the earliest date either party may terminate.91 At least ten years notice must 
be provided,92 hence the importance of a thorough review of the Treaty before the 
year 2014. The operating entities are undertaking studies to inform options to be 
explored by 2014, and have announced that a process of stakeholder input will 
begin on completion of technical studies.93 However, certain of the flood control 
provisions, paid for upfront by the United States to cover sixty years, expire in 
2024.94 This alone has led to consideration of whether the time is ripe for 
modification of the Treaty.95 A logical starting point in this consideration is to 
                                                            
84 Columbia River Treaty, supra note 80, Art. V.  
85 Id. Art. XII. 
86 Exec. Order No. 11,177, 29 Fed. Reg. 13097 (Sept. 16, 1964). 
87 Barton & Ketchum, supra note 67, at 2. 
88 Pacific Northwest Consumer Power Preference Act, 16 U.S.C. § 837 (2006).  
89 Shurts, supra note 68, at 11. 
90 Id. at 17-18. 
91 Columbia River Treaty, supra note 80, Art. XIX.  
92 Id. 
93 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., COLUMBIA RIVER 
TREATY: 2012/2024 REVIEW: PHASE 1 TECHNICAL STUDIES (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/pubs/Columbia_River_Treaty_Review__2_-_April_2009.pdf.  
94 Columbia River Treaty, supra note 80, Art. IV. 
95 See generally Shurts, supra note 68. 
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examine what has changed since 1964 and where the uncertainties lie in 
contemplating basin needs after 2024. 
 
III.  CHANGE: 1964–2010 / DRIVERS OF CHANGE: 2010 FORWARD 
 
The 2009 Columbia River symposium examined both change since 1964, and 
going forward in five categories: (1) change in values concerning the river; (2) 
change in empowerment of local communities and in particular, of Native 
American and First Nation governments; (3) change in the viability of populations 
of anadromous fish that spawn within the Columbia River system; (4) change in 
energy demand; and (5) climate change. This paper will briefly summarize some of 
the important points raised by participants in the Symposium, supplementing 
where appropriate from the literature, in each of these categories. 
Change in values concerning the river: Two approaches to evaluating 
changes in values were used by participants in the Symposium: examination of the 
adoption of new laws reflecting a change in societal values concerning the 
environment; and a reconnaissance level survey of stakeholders in the basin done 
by students at the University of Montana.96 The post-1964 law with the largest 
impact on operation of Columbia River dams on the U.S. side of the border is the 
Endangered Species Act adopted in 1973.97 NOAA Fisheries (then National 
Marine Fisheries Service) began listing anadromous fish in the Columbia River 
system in 1991, and today eight salmon and four steelhead species that rely on 
habitat within the basin are listed.98 Although numerous factors impact these 
species, operation of dams for hydropower has been identified as a major factor 
and operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System (the part of the 
hydropower system at federal dams in the U.S. portion of the basin), has been the 
subject of numerous Biological Opinions and subsequent challenges resulting 
recently in what some refer to as operation of the river by the federal district 
court.99 Although the ESA and subsequent listings reflect a change in values and 
                                                            
96 See generally Matthew McKinney et al., Managing Transboundary Natural Resources: An 
Assessment of the Need to Revise and Update the Columbia River Treaty, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, 
supra note 67 (draft article on file with author). 
97 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
98 Current listings of salmon species found in the Columbia Basin: Snake River Sockeye 
(endangered), Upper Willamette River Chinook (threatened), Lower Columbia River Chinook 
(threatened), Upper Columbia River spring-run Chinook (endangered), Snake River fall-run Chinook 
(threatened), Snake River spring/summer-run Chinook (threatened), Lower Columbia River Coho 
(threatened), Columbia River Chum (threatened). Final Listing Determinations for 16 ESUs of West 
Coast Salmon, 70 Fed. Reg. 37160, 37193 (June 28, 2005). Note that four ESUs of steelhead are also 
currently listed: 69 Fed. Reg. 33105 (June 14, 2004) and 71 Fed. Reg 5178 (Feb. 1, 2006). However, 
these listings are currently in litigation. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. CV06-0483-JCC 
2007 WL 1795036 (W.D. Wash. Jun 13, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 559 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 
2009); see also  NOAA, Northwest Regional Office, ESA Salmon Listings, Salmon Populations, 
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Salmon-Populations/Index.cfm  (last visited Apr. 5, 
2010). 
99 See, e.g., the many challenges to Biological Opinions issued by NOAA Fisheries (formerly 
National Marine Fisheries Service – NMFS) in 1993, 1995, 2000, and 2004: Idaho Dept. Fish and 
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provide a powerful lever for inclusion of issues concerning anadromous fish in any 
negotiation concerning operation of dams on the river, the current gridlock in the 
judicial system may be a further indication that the solution will come through a 
form of governance able to adapt to changing values rather than a lawsuit. 
Environmental historians Paul Hirt100 and Adam Sowards101 looked at a more 
subtle yet pervasive change in laws that reflect a trend surely to impact any effort 
to update the Columbia River Treaty. Beginning with, or resulting in, the passage 
of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966,102 and the National Environmental 
Policy Act in 1970,103 the expectation of the public for access to and participation 
in governmental decision making began to increase dramatically in the United 
States.104 As evidenced by contributions to the book to follow the Symposium by 
scholars studying implementation of the European Union Water Framework 
Directive,105 this phenomenon is not confined to the United States.106 This global 
demand for greater public input to natural resource decision making is also 
evidenced in the adoption of NEPA-like requirement in over eighty countries,107 
and the inclusion of public involvement requirements for water development 
projects funded by the World Bank.108 As will be discussed below, utilization of 
this greater demand for participation can actually contribute to resilience in water 
resource governance. 
A reconnaissance level situation assessment of stakeholders in the Columbia 
River basin done by students at the University of Montana under the direction of 
consortium member Dr. Matthew McKinney confirmed this expectation of public 
                                                            
Game v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 1994); American Rivers v. National Marine 
Fisheries Service, CV 96-384-MA,1997 WL 33797790 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997); National Wildlife 
Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003); National 
Wildlife Fund v. National Marine Fisheries Service CV 01-640-RE, 2005 WL 1278878 (D. Or. Oct. 
7, 2005); National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 422 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 
2005); National Wildlife Foundation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, CV 01-640 RE, 2005 WL 
2488447 (D. OR.); NWF v. NMFS, 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008). 
100 Arizona State University. 
101 University of Idaho. 
102 5 U.S.C. §552 (2006). 
103 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)). 
104 Hirt & Sowards, supra note 71, at 20-21. While FOIA required governmental agencies to 
make public documents available to the public, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), NEPA goes further by 
requiring agencies to actually develop the information necessary to evaluate the impact of a federal 
action on the human environment, provide that information to the public, and respond to public 
comment. 42 USC § 4332 (2006); 5 USC § 552 (2006). 
105 Council Directive 2000/60/EC, 2000 O.J. (L. 327) 1-73 (EC), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html.  
106 Lucia De Stefano & Guido Schmidt, Public Participation and Water Management in the 
European Union: Experiences and Lessons Learned, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft 
article on file with author).  
107 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY, 
783 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2003). 
108  See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: MAKING SERVICES 
WORK FOR POOR PEOPLE (2004). 
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input within the basin.109 A situation assessment uses a defined list of questions 
and an initial list of major players with respect to the particular issues.110 It then 
proceeds with a “snowball” sampling method which consists of ending each 
interview by asking who else the interviewer should speak to.111 The interview 
process ends when no new information is being obtained.112 In the context of the 
class used by Dr. McKinney to interview stakeholders in the Columbia River 
basin, this endpoint was not reached. Twenty-seven people were interviewed on 
both sides of the international border and the final recommendations included that 
the assessment must be expanded.113 The initial assessment nevertheless identified 
several key perceptions. First, if measured by the 1964 goal of flood protection and 
increased power production, the Columbia River Treaty has been an outstanding 
success.114 Second, among the key issues identified by stakeholders that were not 
addressed in 1964, but should be in the future, the health of the salmon fishery, and 
participation by affected communities, Native American tribes and First Nations, 
stood out as themes repeated by many interviewees.115 This perception is paralleled 
by the dramatic change in empowerment among basin communities addressed 
next. 
Changes in empowerment of local communities and in particular, of 
Native American and First Nation governments: As discussed in Part II, local 
participation in knowledge generation and decision making is an important factor 
for resilience in governance involving ecological systems. However, this 
participation has led to enhanced empowerment and capacity of basin 
communities, suggesting that they have the capacity to participate and are likely to 
demand participation in any decision on whether to and how to modify the Treaty: 
(1) legal recognition of the treaty rights of certain Native American tribes to 
participate in the harvest and management of Columbia basin fisheries within the 
United States; (2) establishment of the Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
in the United States in 1980; (3) Constitutional recognition of the rights of First 
Nations in Canada in 1982; and (4) legislative recognition of the Columbia Basin 
Trust in Canada in 1995. This increased local and regional capacity will be an 
important component of moving toward resilience in governance discussed below. 
To begin, it is important to understand these changes. 
First, among the rights secured by certain Columbia basin tribes south of the 
49th Parallel at the council of Walla Walla in 1855, is the right to continue to use 
                                                            
109 McKinney et al., supra note 96, at 5.  
110 Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT, 99, 108-113 
(Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999). 
111 Id. at 114. 
112 Id. 
113 McKinney et al., supra note 96, at 20. 
114 Id. at 17. 
115 Id. at 19. 
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their former fishing grounds on lands outside the newly designated reservations.116 
For example, Article 3 of the Nez Perce Treaty reserves: “[t]he exclusive right of 
taking fish in all the streams where running through or bordering said reservation 
is further secured to said Indians; as also the right of taking fish at all usual and 
accustomed places in common with citizens of the Territory.”117 The language 
stating that the right is “in common with citizens of the Territory,” was interpreted 
by Judge Boldt of the U.S. District Court, Washington in 1974, to entitle treaty 
tribes to up to 50% of the harvestable fish that pass (or would pass absent harvest 
en route118) the usual and accustomed fishing places.119 At the time of the council 
in 1855, non-Indian fishing in the area was minor;120 however, once canneries 
made large scale commercial fishing possible,121 non-Indian harvest began to 
present major competition for the fish. However, the ruling recognizing the legal 
right of Native American’s equal access to fish would not come until over a decade 
after the Columbia River Treaty was finalized. In affirming the District Court, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the right of treaty tribes “in common 
with citizens of the Territory,” as analogous to a co-tenancy, stating:  
 
[C]otenants stand in a fiduciary relationship one to the other. Each has 
the right to full enjoyment of the property, but must use it as a reasonable 
property owner. A cotenant is liable for waste if he destroys the property 
or abuses it so as to permanently impair its value . . . By analogy, neither 
the treaty Indians nor the state on behalf of its citizens may permit the 
subject matter of these treaties to be destroyed.122  
 
                                                            
116 See generally ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE NEZ PERCE INDIANS AND THE OPENING OF THE 
NORTHWEST, 292-332 (1965) (speaking to the importance of maintaining traditional fisheries in treaty 
negotiation). 
117 Treaty between the United States of America and the Nez Perce Indians, art. III, June 11, 
1855 12 Stat. 957. During 1854 and 1855, Stevens negotiated treaties with 11 northwest tribes. 
United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312, 330 (W. D. Wash. 1974) aff;d 525 
F.2d. 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1975) (affirming treaty fishing rights 
associated with this treaty language). For accounts of the gathering of the northwest Tribes on Mill 
Creek in the Walla Walla Valley and the negotiations with Governor Stevens, see JOSEPHY, supra 
note 116. See also Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 355  (“At the treaty negotiations, a primary 
concern of the Indians whose way of life was so heavily dependent upon harvesting anadromous fish, 
was that they have freedom to move about to gather food, particularly salmon, (which both Indians 
and non-Indians meant to include steelhead), at their usual and accustomed fishing places.”). 
118 Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 344.  
119 Id. at  343; see also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass. 443 U.S. 658, 685 (1979) (responding to litigation involving implementation of the Boldt 
decision, the Court stated: “[A]n equitable measure of the common right should initially divide the 
harvestable portion of each run that passes through a ‘usual and accustomed’ place into 
approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the Treaty share if tribal 
needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount.”). 
120 Boldt Decision, 384 F. at 352. 
121Id. See also Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. at 668 (“Not 
until major economic developments in canning and processing occurred in the last few years of the 
19th century did a significant non-Indian fishery develop.”). 
122 United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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In the wake of these decisions the four tribal governments implicated, the Nez 
Perce, Confederated Bands of the Yakama Nation, Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation, and Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs 
Reservation, formed the Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission (“CRITFC”) 
in 1977 to unite the efforts of the four tribal governments to renew their sovereign 
authority in fisheries management.123 This legal recognition of rights combined 
with the capacity building reflected in the scientific and policy work of CRITFC, 
has elevated the status of the four tribes to co-managers of salmon in the U.S. 
portion of the Columbia River basin. 
In addition to the tribes participating in CRITFC, the five upper Columbia 
tribes in the United States have joined together on various resource issues of 
common concern forming the Upper Columbia United Tribes (“UCUT”).124 The 
primary common issue among the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the Kalispel Tribe of 
Indians, the Spokane Tribe of Indians, the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, and the 
Confederated Tribe of the Colville Reservation is the blockage of their lands from 
anadromous fish migration by Grand Coulee Dam.125 In 2005 UCUT and its 
member tribes entered a memorandum of understanding with Bonneville Power 
Administration recognizing the sovereign role of the tribes in management of, 
among other things, fish and water resources.126 
Second, the Northwest Power Act of 1980,127 built local and regional capacity 
to participate in decision making about the management of the Colombia River. 
The Act is an interstate compact approved by the legislatures of Idaho, Montana, 
Oregon, and Washington and by Congress to give the four states a greater role in 
decision making with respect to electric power and fish and wildlife in the 
Columbia River basin.128 The resulting Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council (“Council”) is made up of two political appointees from each state, has 
legal and technical staff, and is funded through power revenues from Bonneville 
Power Administration.129 The Council has three primary objectives: 
 
                                                            
123 Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission, http://www.critfc.org/text/work.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
124 See Upper Columbia United Tribes, http://www.ucut.org/index.ydev (last visited on Mar. 
18, 2010). 
125 Upper Columbia United Tribes, Programs, In the Field, http://www.ucut.org/in_the_field.y 
dev#news_paragraph6 (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
126 Id. 
127 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, (Northwest Power Act), 
Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697. From the preamble to the Act: “To assist the electrical consumers 
of the Pacific Northwest through use of the Federal Columbia River Power System to achieve cost-
effective energy conservation, to encourage the development of renewable energy resources, to 
establish a representative regional power planning process, to assure the region of an efficient and 
adequate power supply, and for other purposes.” Id. 
128 See Northwest Power and Conservation Council, http://www.nwcouncil.org/Default.htm 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
129 Id. 
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1. develop a 20-year electric power plan that will guarantee adequate 
and reliable energy at the lowest economic and environmental cost to the 
Northwest  
2. develop a program to protect and rebuild fish and wildlife populations 
affected by hydropower development in the Columbia River Basin  
3. educate and involve the public in the Council’s decision-making 
processes. 130 
 
The Act requires all actions of Bonneville Power Administration (“BPA”) to 
be consistent with the Council’s electric power plan.131 In contrast, the fish and 
wildlife program is intended to be based on input from states, tribes and federal 
agencies, and to complement their activities, but it is not the role of the Council or 
BPA to reconcile the fish and wildlife program with hydropower operations in the 
basin.132 As part of its efforts to develop a fish and wildlife program and to involve 
the public, the Council undertook a sub-basin planning process completed in 2005, 
to identify and prioritize habitat restoration opportunities.133 The Council’s positive 
efforts to involve the public in habitat restoration decisions, juxtaposed with the 
absence of any connection between these efforts and BPA decisions on power, 
have led to an informed but frustrated public.134 The Council has no formal role 
associated with the Columbia River Treaty. The fact that the entity which must 
generate hydropower consistent with the Council’s energy plan and one of the U.S. 
entities appointed to operate the Treaty are the same, BPA, merely provides an 
informal means of communication and coordination but not one that must be 
utilized. The Council has no direct role in treaty implementation or any decision to 
modify the Treaty, but its formation and efforts to involve and educate the public 
signal an increase in capacity within the basin to seek a role in the decision making 
process. 
Neither CRITFC nor the Council should be viewed as providing a unified 
voice in treaty decisions for their respective members. Upstream and downstream 
tribes and states frequently have conflicting interests.135 Nevertheless, these 
organizations have greatly increased the knowledge and capacity of their members 
to weigh in on Treaty issues. This capacity did not exist in 1964. 
Third, the capacity of First Nations to participate in decision making has also 
increased in the Canadian portion of the basin. For example, Britain granted 
                                                            
130 Id. 
131 Northwest Power Act § 839b(d)(2). 
132 Id. § 839b(h). 
133 Northwest Power and Conservation Council, supra note 128. The process resulted in 
restoration plans for 58 tributary watersheds and mainstem segments. Id. 
134 See, e.g., MICHAEL BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF 
THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON (2002). 
135 See, e.g., Press Release, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, CRITFC, The 
Accords, The Biological Opinions (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.critfc.org/text/press/2009 
0930.html. See also BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, ADMINISTRATOR’S RECORD OF DECISION 
2008 COLUMBIA BASIN FISH ACCORDS (2008), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/Files/ 
BiologicalOpinions/MOA_ROD.pdf.  
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Canada full sovereignty in 1982, when the Canadian Constitution was patriated,136 
and the Constitution Act of 1982 recognized aboriginal and treaty rights, including 
rights acquired through land claim agreements, of aboriginal people in Canada.137 
This formal constitutional recognition is expected to elevate the status of First 
Nations in providing input on any decision by Canada regarding the Treaty. 138 
Fourth, the Columbia Basin Trust (“the Trust”)139 has become a major player 
on the Canadian side of the basin. Its formation is described on its website: 
 
Despite the significant changes that occurred across the Columbia 
Basin as a result of the Treaty, there was a lack of consultation with 
residents. The people of the Basin came together in the early 1990s to 
press the Province of BC for recognition of the injustice of this situation. 
Local governments coordinated their efforts (at the regional district and 
tribal council levels and in partnership with elected officials) under the 
formation of the Columbia River Treaty Committee, in order to approach 
and negotiate with the Province. 
Negotiations were successful and, in 1995, Columbia Basin Trust 
was established. A binding agreement was also established which 
resulted in the following for the residents of the Basin through Columbia 
Basin Trust: 
• $276 million to finance power project construction;  
• $45 million, with CBT used as an endowment; and  
• $2 million per year from 1996 to 2010 for operations.140 
 
The Trust has participation from First Nations and other communities in the 
Columbia River basin in Canada. The recognition of the Trust by the Province of 
British Columbia in 1995, and the knowledge and capacity built by the Trust 
through its substantial funding, suggests that the people of the basin in Canada will 
not be excluded from future treaty decisions. The involvement of the Trust in 
hydropower development and partial funding through sale of the Canadian 
Entitlement also suggests that its input may be more nuanced than its roots in 
seeking redress from harms caused by implementation of the Treaty would 
suggest.  
Changes in the viability of populations of anadromous fish that spawn 
within the Columbia River system: The decline of anadromous fish in the 
Columbia River system has been extensively documented, thus it will be briefly 
addressed here. It is important to note that the blockage of migration from Canada 
                                                            
136 Patriation of Canada’s constitution was the process of eliminating the need for an act of the 
British Parliament to amend the constitution and thus the acquisition of full sovereignty for Canada. 
137 Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, sec. 35 (1982), available at http://www.solon.org/Constitution 
s/Canada/English/ca_1982.html. 
138 Garry Merkel, The Columbia River and First Nations, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 
67 (draft forward on file with author).  
139 See The Columbia Basin Trust, About Us, http://www.cbt.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). 
140 Id.  
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and the reservations of certain upper Columbia River Native American tribes was a 
fate accompli by the time of the 1964 Columbia River Treaty. The completion of 
Grand Coulee Dam in 1942 accomplished this task.   
However, the impact of the elimination of habitat by the construction of 
Grand Coulee Dam will be important in any discussion of the resilience of the 
anadromous fish populations in the basin. In the remaining portion of the basin, 
salmon declined from an estimated high of 6 to 16 million in the early 1880s to 
less than 1 million today.141 The salmon fishery in the Columbia River basin is 
now supported by 200 hatcheries.142 Ongoing litigation143 concerning operation of 
the federal dams and salmon recovery, points to relative gridlock between the two 
competing values. It is difficult to argue that these changes were not foreseen,144 
but it is clear that the solution chosen, hatcheries, may not be the answer.  
One caution raised at the Symposium is important to note: “‘It is uncertain 
whether degraded salmon ecosystems remain sufficiently resilient to respond 
positively to ongoing restoration programs, or have shifted to a stable, low-
productivity state that may persist regardless of the climatic regime.’”145 Under the 
definition of resilience: “[t]he amount of disturbance an ecosystem can 
accommodate without shifting to a fundamentally different structure, function and 
feedback mechanisms . . . ,”146 it is possible that we have so altered the ecological 
system of the Columbia River that salmon restoration in any way resembling a 
natural system is impossible, creative governance notwithstanding. 
In a recent special 2009 issue from Ecology and Society on Pathways to 
Resilient Salmon Ecosystems,147 scientists explored the prospects for Pacific 
salmon, including Columbia River populations. In contrast to the single population 
of Atlantic salmon, Pacific salmon have adapted to a relatively dynamic geologic 
coastline and riverine environment of the west coast through the development of 
                                                            
141 Chris Peery, The Effects of Dams and Flow Management on Columbia River Ecosystem 
Processes, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft article at 2, on file with author). 
142 Id. 
143 See cases cited supra note 99. 
144 Daniel Bottom et al., Reconnecting Social And Ecological Resilience in Salmon Ecosystems, 
14(1) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 5 (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2009), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety. 
org/vol14/iss1/art5/ (PDF link at top of page) 
 
In an open letter to the Oregon State legislature in 1875, U.S. Commissioner of Fish and 
Fisheries Spencer Baird painted a grim future for Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) in 
the Columbia River (Baird 1875). Based on the collapse of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) 
in Northeast American rivers decades earlier, Baird predicted that Columbia River 
salmon would suffer a similar fate for the same reasons: habitat loss, excessive harvest, 
and dams and other impediments to fish migration. 
 
145 Thomas M. Leschine, Salmon Fisheries on the Columbia from a Resilience Perspective: 
Past, Present and Future, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft at 15, on file with author) 
(quoting Bottom et al., supra note 144, at ABSTRACT). 
146 Id. See also Bottom et al., supra note 144, at Abstract.  
147 Pathways to Resilient Salmon, 14(1) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2009), 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/view.php?sf=34 (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
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multiple locally adapted populations.148 The 10 million year survival of Pacific 
salmon in the face of a highly dynamic coastal environment is a tribute to their 
resilience.149 However, anthropogenic changes have occurred on both a scale and 
timeframe that does not match historic variability in the system.150 Thus, key to 
restoring salmon resilience is not merely to maintain genetic diversity through 
hatcheries, but to re-establish the natural processes that led to adaptation.151 
Because salmon have the audacity to use the entire length of a river system as well 
as the ocean to complete their life cycle, this requires a daunting level of cross-
jurisdictional coordination.152 
Changes in energy demand: Energy demand and development has not 
proceeded as contemplated by the Treaty drafters in 1964. At that time, planners 
expected the rapid growth in power demand that followed World War II to 
continue.153 This would mean that new thermal generation would have to rapidly 
replace hydropower as the dominant source of energy in the Pacific Northwest.154 
Conservation nation-wide in the wake of the 1970’s energy crisis altered this 
picture, but not before the commitment of major expenditures on development of 
nuclear power had been made in the Pacific Northwest. The major overestimate of 
demand and underestimate of the cost of nuclear power plants led to a debacle the 
region is not anxious to repeat and the plants were not completed.155 As a result, 
hydropower remains the dominant energy source in the region156 and the value of 
the system has grown dramatically. With the current push to develop non-carbon 
sources of energy, hydropower is likely to become even more valuable. The recent 
draft power plan released in September 2009 by the NWPCC indicates that “the 
most cost effective and least risky resource for the region” to meet electricity 
demand over the next twenty years “is improved efficiency of electricity use.”157 If 
                                                            
148 See Robin S. Waples, Evolutionary History, Habitat Disturbance Regimes, and 
Anthropogenic Changes: What Do These Mean for Resilience of Pacific Salmon Populations?, 14(1) 
ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY ( SPECIAL ISSUE) 3, 10 (2009), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org 
/vol14/iss1/art3/ (PDF link at top of page).  
149 Michael C. Healey, Resilient Salmon, Resilient Fisheries for British Columbia, Canada, 
14(1) ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2, 5 (2009), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety 
.org/vol14/iss1/art2/ (PDF link at top of page).  
150 Id. at 1.  
151 Id. at 6. 
152 See generally Bottom et al., supra note 144 (article premise focuses on the necessary 
elements for cross-jurisdictional coordination). 
153 Shurts, supra note 68, at 19. 
154 Id. 
155 WHITE, supra note 2, at 79. “This effort by the Washington Public Power Supply System 
(WPPSS referred to as ‘Whoops’) to build 5 nuclear power plants, ran over budget and head on to 
electric demand far below protections. Construction of the last two reactors was abandoned and only 
one of the first three reactors ever produced electricity.” Id. at 79-80. 
156 Hirt & Sowards, supra note 71, at 31 (noting that 60 percent of the region’s power supply 
comes from hydropower). 
157 NORTHWEST POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, DRAFT SIXTH NORTHWEST POWER PLAN, 
PLAN OVERVIEW 1-2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/6/final/ 
Ch1_021010.pdf. 
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this projection proves true, it is likely hydropower will remain at the core of 
northwest energy production through any near-term scenarios. 
Climate change: Water planners have long relied on data from a historic 
period of record to project water supply into the future. It is the seasonal variation, 
and the year-to-year variation that can be forecast within the degrees of historical 
variability, that the type of agency (or “entity”) level operational planning 
envisioned by the 1964 Columbia River Treaty handles well. Under the Treaty, the 
entities must develop two levels of operating plans. First, an advanced planning 
stage results in an Assured Operating Plan (“AOP”) each year for six years in 
advance.158 This allows planning for such things as new power generation.159 
Second, the Detailed Operating Plan (“DOP”) is prepared each year for the 
following year to update the AOP and to provide more details on operations.160 
Third, the Treaty Storage Regulation (“TSR”) study is done during the actual 
operating year and is based on both the DOP and current conditions, and defines 
storage and draft requirements for treaty reservoirs.161 Finally, Supplemental 
Operating Agreements (“SOA”) may be used to vary from the TSR if mutual 
benefits in power, flood control fisheries, or other values may be achieved.162 In 
this way, the Treaty provides sufficient flexibility for adaptive management to 
account for seasonal and year-to-year uncertainty within the limited purposes of 
the Treaty. 
Climate change takes us out of the range of variation that can be predicted 
based on historic behavior.163 Most current discussion on climate change focuses 
on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.164 This is an important goal. However, 
due to the lag in impact, even the most aggressive efforts at reduction in emissions 
will not prevent continued impact for the foreseeable future.165 Climate experts 
recommend planning for adaptation through use of scenarios that represent a range 
of possible futures, rather than projections based on historic behavior of a 
system.166 Thus, given the range of potential temperature and precipitation 
changes, governance that is adaptive to climate change must include authorization 
                                                            
158 Barton & Ketchum, supra note 67, at 6. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Hamlet, supra note 69, at 16-20. 
164 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE 
COPENHAGEN ACCORD (2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/ 
cop15_cph_auv.pdf (the Accord includes some language on adaptation.). For general information on 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference of 2009, see Denmark, Climate and Energy, COP 15, 
Copenhagen 2009, http://www.denmark.dk/en/menu/Climate-Energy/COP15-Copenhagen-2009/ 
(last visited Mar. 18. 2010). 
165 See generally Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, in 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  1704 (2009), available at  
http://www.pnas.org/content/106/6/1704.full.pdf+html. 
166 See generally id. (discussing the impact of climate change on traditional models). 
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that allows managers to respond to actual outcomes ranging from the best case to 
the worst case scenario.167  
Modeling by the Climate Impacts Group suggests that precipitation may not 
change dramatically within the Columbia River basin, albeit substantial uncertainty 
is associated with this statement.168 However, changes in annual snowpack can be 
predicted with greater certainty and are already underway in the basin.169 The basin 
relies on snowpack as natural storage that, similar to reservoirs, moderates summer 
flows. With climate change, reduction in snow-water equivalent may be as much 
as 35% in the U.S. portion of the basin by 2060 and 12% in the Canadian portion 
of the basin.170 This reduction in natural storage means that the artificial storage 
configuration in the basin will be insufficient to reap the power benefits available 
in the past.171 In particular, summer production which serves utilities in the 
southwestern U.S. will decrease if the current configuration is maintained.172  
Moving out of the historic water supply regime has impacts beyond power 
production. The Columbia River Treaty provides an excellent framework to 
address high flow. However, it does not address low flow under a climate change 
scenario.173 Adaptation to climate change for other uses such as irrigation and 
fisheries requires response by multiple agencies in the U.S. with no framework for 
coordination.174 Irrigation occurs during the summer season when the lowest flows 
will occur if storage is insufficient. The result of failure to address low flows: fish 
and farmers will bear the brunt of climate change if no effort is made to adapt.175 
 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING RESILIENCE THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
The call for change in governance to address the failures of multi-
jurisdictional management of natural resources is not a new concept.176 Efforts by 
legal scholars to address the issue of management of complex, multi-jurisdictional 
ecological systems tends to take a case study approach involving identification of 
good multi-jurisdictional management when we see it, then attempting to draw 
lessons related to why the particular approach worked that might be transferrable 
                                                            
167 Hamlet, supra note 69, at 16-20. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 16-20; Anne Nolin, Eric Sproles, & Aimee Brown, Climate Change Impacts on Snow 
and Water Resources in the Columbia, Willamette, and McKenzie River Basins, USA: A Nested 
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176 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 795 (2005); GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, TAC BACKGROUND PAPERS, No. 4: INTEGRATED 
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, 67 (2000) available at www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/Tacno4. 
pdf; see Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54 (discussing solutions to problems associated with the 
environmental administrative state).  
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to other settings.177 The value of using case studies is the grounding of scholarly 
effort in real world experience. Particularly in the realm of complex systems, initial 
efforts at research must be empirically based. This research seeks to add to that 
literature by viewing governance through the lens of resilience theory and thus 
providing a transferrable framework for modifications to administrative law.178 
This paper has set forth the theoretical basis for resilient or adaptive governance. In 
the following paragraphs, an attempt will be made to translate that theoretical basis 
into a framework for an administrative response and will use its application to the 
Columbia River basin for grounding in reality. Ongoing research at the University 
of Idaho College of Law and interdisciplinary Waters of the West Program is 
seeking to translate the framework into a specific model or models for 
administrative law and is planned to be reported in a future paper. 
The following list identifies the elements of the administrative law or process 
aspects of adaptive governance to facilitate resilience in social-ecological systems. 
The list is followed by a discussion of each element and its application to the 
Columbia River basin: 
• Multiple, overlapping levels of control with one level of either control or 
strong coordination at the scale of the particular social-ecological system; 
• Horizontal and vertical transfer of information and coordination of 
decision-making among entities and individuals with a decision making role; 
• Meaningful public participation; 
• Local capacity building; and 
• Authority to respond (adapt) to changes in circumstances across a range of 
scenarios. 
Each of these elements will be discussed in turn, however it is worth noting 
that in addition to these process elements, facilitation of resilience in social-
ecological systems will also require changes in substantive environmental and 
natural resources laws by incorporating a bias for decision making that enhances 
resilience rather than optimization. Thus, when faced with two possible choices, 
the approach that fosters ecological system resilience is chosen. For example,  
hatchery design to more closely mimic natural conditions (an approach currently 
being attempted by the Nez Perce Tribe in an experimental hatchery),179 would be 
chosen over traditional fish hatchery design to optimize fish numbers; or the use of 
spill from dams to mimic natural conditions would be chosen over the use of 
                                                            
177 See, e.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 176 (using the CalFed process for management of 
the California Bay-Delta system as what, at the time, appeared to be a good example of formal 
establishment of a multi-agency multi-level governance network); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54, at 
46-48 (describing the weak networks of the Gulf Hypoxia Task Force as an effective means to 
address a large-scale, complex environmental problem across multiple jurisdictions and levels of 
government); Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 50 (looking at the application of adaptive 
management to the Everglades and Grand Canyon). 
178 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54, at 41-45 (drawing on several theories of governance 
including Dynamic Federalism, New Governance, and Transgovernmental Network theories). 
179 See Nez Perce Tribal Hatchery, http://www.nezperce.org/~dfrm/Production/npth.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2010). 
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tanker trucks to move smolts around dams.180 This movement of the substance of 
natural resource management—from optimization to resilience, and from 
command and control to adaptive management—is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it is being actively explored by much of the research cited above and in legal 
scholarship.181 This paper will focus on the following process elements. 
Multiple, overlapping levels of control with one level of either control or 
strong coordination at the scale of the particular social-ecological system: 
Matching the scale of governance to the scale of the problem has gained traction in 
legal scholarship.182 However, as noted by Ruhl and Salzman, complex systems do 
not always have clearly identifiable scales for governance.183 A scale that may be 
appropriate for one problem is not relevant for another.184 Complicating the scale 
issue even more is the fact that the source of the problem and the negative impact 
may occur at different scales thus removing any incentive for action at the scale of 
the source of the problem.185 We have seen this in the form of backlash to some of 
the environmental laws passed in the 1970s. For example, the failure of states to 
take action led to federal regulation to achieve clean water,186 clean air,187 and 
species protection.188 Yet matching the scale of regulation to the scale of the 
problem did nothing to convince local land use planning to address non-point 
source pollution (important to downstream water quality),189 or persuade local 
developers to support the changes required to protect wetlands (important to 
                                                            
180  See, e.g., Columbia River History, Fish Transportation, Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council, http://www.nwcouncil.org/history/FishTransportation.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). 
181 See, e.g., Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 50; Sandra Zellmer, Floods, Famines, or 
Feasts: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right, 24(3) NR&E 20 (Winter 2010). 
182 See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54, at 10 (citing Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. 
Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental 
Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 23 (1996)). 
183 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54. 
184 Id. 
185 See, e.g., Jerrold Long, From Warranted to Valuable Belief: Local Government, Climate 
Change, and Giving Up the Pickup to Save Bangladesh, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming Apr. 
2010) (arguing that the difference in scale between global climate change and the source of a 
significant portion of the problem in individual and local land use planning choices on issues like 
transportation removes the incentive to take action.). 
186 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). 
187 Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). 
188 Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
189 See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN, & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER (1993). 
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filtration of polluted water and flood mitigation on a larger scale),190 or an obscure 
species (important to biodiversity in general).191  
As discussed in Part III, in contrast to the difficult search for the appropriate 
match in scale, resilience thinking rejects the call for a single, efficient level of 
management and instead calls for multiple overlapping authority. This approach 
then allows response at different scales across different entities depending on the 
source and impacts of the problem. Ruhl and Salzman provide an overview of the 
literature on Dynamic Federalism, which calls for dual and overlapping federal and 
state authority to allow an evolving response to the change in scale of a problem 
and an increased likelihood that system response to anthropogenic activity will be 
detected at multiple scales.192 In addition to its inclusion of any level of 
governance and non-governmental local action, resilience thinking adds to this the 
concept of assuring that coordination must at least occur at the scale of the social-
ecological system involved. 
Governance within the Columbia River Basin follows the traditional approach 
with little local input, role, or exchange in international and national operations. 
Flood control is managed at the macro level through storage operation, with no 
local role for maintaining the connection between the river and the floodplain or 
regulating development out of the floodplain. Nevertheless, as noted by Eve Vogel, 
a contributor to the forthcoming Symposium volume, it is the Columbia River 
Treaty, entered by two governments functioning at a scale much larger than the 
river basin that allowed regionalization of the management of the entire Columbia 
mainstem across numerous states and an international boundary.193 Thus, given the 
jurisdictional boundaries, governance of the river basin may require inclusion of 
government at a larger scale to achieve coordination on the scales of a social-
ecological system.  
Looking further to the passage of the Northwest Power Act in 1980, which 
provided both a role for states in power planning and a means to coordinate, as 
well as a means for local capacity building on the issue of habitat restoration, it did 
not provide a state or local say in whether power production should be optimized 
                                                            
190 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (holding: (1) term “navigable 
waters,” under CWA, includes only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water, not 
intermittent or ephemeral flows of water; and (2) only those wetlands with a continuous surface 
connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right are adjacent to such waters 
and covered by the CWA); Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflict in Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: 
Solutions for the Law-Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resource Law, 48 NAT. 
RESOURCES J., 257 (2008). 
191 National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied 524 U.S. 927 (1998) (holding the listing of a species under the Endangered Species Act when 
the species is found within a small range entirely within a single state is an appropriate exercise of 
federal authority under the commerce clause due to the impact in decline in biodiversity on interstate 
commerce). 
192 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54, at 47. 
193 See generally Eve Vogel, Regionalization and Democratization Through International Law: 
Intertwined Jurisdictions, Scales and Politics in the Columbia River Treaty, in COLUMBIA 
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft manuscript, on file with author). 
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over all other ecosystem services from the river. That decision remains static in the 
choice of hydropower and flood control as the primary international goals.  
If the parties to the Columbia River Treaty seek a more resilient form of river 
governance, it will require a change in the operations implementation of the Treaty 
to allow more flexible response at the international level and greater local input at 
the level of operational decisions. The entities necessary to provide multiple, 
overlapping authority now exist in the Columbia River basin, but it is their input to 
the Treaty and operational decisions and their role in implementation that would 
need to change. The coordination required for this greater degree of adaptive 
capacity across and between levels of authority will require both sharing of 
information and coordination of decision-making. 
Horizontal and vertical transfer of information and coordination of 
decision-making among entities and individuals with a decision-making role: 
As we have seen in recent years with the formation of the Department of 
Homeland Security in an effort to coordinate our various intelligence gathering 
agencies, sharing of information is crucial to reducing uncertainty when problems 
occur and are caused at multiple scales and from diverse sources. Yet, while the 
single-entity, high-level coordination of information may be well suited to 
reducing uncertainty, it is less suitable for an appropriate response to the incident 
that inevitably occurs because uncertainty in areas like terrorism or climate change 
can never be reduced to zero. Instead, as is asserted above that the appropriate, or 
resilient, response requires multiple levels of authority, including the local level. 
The weakness in responding to either a sudden or slow incident through multiple 
entities is the inability to coordinate decision-making and information exchange 
across jurisdictional boundaries.  
However, an excellent example of a proven and highly robust system for 
overcoming this weakness is presented to the general public on national news on 
an annual, if not more frequent basis. The example is the incident command 
system for multi-jurisdictional response to a large-scale, often mass casualty, 
emergency. The incident command system is a highly robust process for multi-
entity response to an emergency, in which the scale and timing was highly 
uncertain prior to its occurrence.194 Rather than create a new agency at the scale of 
every conceivable emergency, the incident command system provides a means for 
rapid crisis response across multiple agencies at the same level and through 
multiple levels of agencies. The system works on the rule of sevens. The incident 
commander is at the top level of response. No more than seven people or entities 
report to the incident commander, no more than seven to each of those seven, etc., 
until the on-the-ground response to, for example, a wildfire, a flood, or an 
earthquake, may involve hundreds or even thousands of people. In the author’s 
                                                            
194 See, e.g., THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 
emergency/nims/NIMSFAQs.pdf; U.S. Forest Service, International Programs, Disaster Mitigation 
Program, http://www.fs.fed.us/global/aboutus/dmp/welcome.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) (please 
note, the author has personal experience with this system responding to wild-land fires as a former 
volunteer with Lewis and Clark County, Montana, Search and Rescue). 
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experience, the initial hours or even days of response to a large scale emergency 
are often chaotic as response personnel move into position, assess the scope of the 
problem and identify the chain of command. However, within a remarkably short 
period of time, given the level of uncertainty involved, a relatively smooth 
operation emerges in which information and coordination of decisions in response 
to changes in the problem flow rapidly within and between levels.  
Other than a flood event, the types of change and uncertainty in the Columbia 
River basin are not on the time scale of an emergency. Nevertheless, we can take a 
least three lessons from the incident command system. First, coordination and 
communication among different entities works better if it is an express requirement 
and assigned position within each entity. Second, practice improves response. 
Under the incident command system, the operation appears to be much smoother 
in response to incidents, such as wildfire, that occur somewhat predictably on an 
annual time scale, than it is in response to rare events, such as a hurricane or 
earthquake. In the context of Columbia River management, this could translate into 
frequent information sharing among entities as a building block in the relationships 
necessary for multi-jurisdictional decision making. The current high level of 
coordination among the operating entities is an excellent model for this process. 
Third, substantial resources must be devoted to the local level. The current 
structure of resource availability, both with respect to funding and people, for 
entities that manage natural resources may need to be inverted, with greater 
resources made available at the local rather than national level. This will be 
discussed further under local capacity building. 
However, mandating the flow of information and coordination among 
jurisdictions is not likely to be enough. In their work on adaptive governance, 
Folke et al. note that success in managing ecological systems for resilience often 
depends on the involvement of key personality types such as mavens (“altruistic 
individuals, with social skills, who serve as information brokers, sharing and 
trading what they know”),195 connectors (“individuals who know lots of people not 
only by numbers but the kind of people they know and in particular the diversity of 
acquaintances”),196 and entrepreneurial leaders (creative decision makers willing to 
risk being the first to try something).197 This is consistent with the author’s 
experience in multi-jurisdictional water negotiations in which success is often 
determined by key personalities involved.198 It is also reflected in the reliance of 
Ruhl and Salzman on Transgovernmental Network theory in which “weak ties” are 
formed among individuals working at various levels of governance and non-
                                                            
195 Folke et al., supra note 44, at 454 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW 
LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000)). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 451. 
198 See, e.g., Barbara Cosens, The 1997 Water Rights Settlement Between the State of Montana 
and the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation—The Role of Community and of the 
Trustee, 16 J. ENVT. L. & POL’Y 255 (1998) (water negotiations in which the leadership of key people 
within the Tribal leadership and the local community led to a novel effort to develop a joint drinking 
water system). 
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governmental organizations.199 Administrative law and institutional structure 
cannot mandate the type of personality involved, but could be designed to 
maximize diversity, thus increasing the likelihood that these personality types are 
represented. In addition, organizational structures may be set up to provide 
positions and incentives for people who play the roles of maven, connector, and 
entrepreneurial leader.200 Universities have the responsibility for educating this 
type of manager. 
The groundwork for connecting local knowledge and input to national level 
decisions has been laid in the Columbia River basin by the formation of the 
NWPCC on the U.S. side and its sub-basin planning process, and by the CBT on 
the Canadian side through its grassroots origins. However, the connection between 
this increased local and regional capacity and the Treaty implementing entities 
does not cover the range of communication and coordination necessary for 
resilience. Admittedly, overlapping authority over the storage and release of water 
on a connected river system would present a problem. But this is purely a technical 
coordination function focused on the operation of dams. In governance terms, the 
overlapping authority would not be for daily operation, but for the provision of 
power, flood control, and ecosystem health. Considered in this light, it may not be 
the 1964 Columbia River Treaty for technical operation of existing storage and 
hydropower production that requires modification, but a new treaty giving political 
level oversight and decision making or coordination on broader issues. It is at this 
level of decision making that the input of the public carries sway. 
Meaningful public participation: As noted above, meaningful public 
participation is more than a checklist under NEPA regulations of: (1) making 
information available; (2) allowing public comment; and (3) responding to public 
comment.201 Meaningful public participation means a flow of information in both 
directions with agencies incorporating local knowledge where appropriate. 
Meaningful public participation requires that the exchange of information and 
input occur at a time and place convenient to local citizens whose participation is 
unpaid. This may require attendance by agency personnel at community meetings 
that are already scheduled on a regular basis, rather than holding separate 
meetings.202 For a long-term, complex process, it may also require funding for the 
participation of local leaders. Finally, meaningful public participation means that 
the public input has some influence over the final decision if appropriate. This 
aspect is difficult to accomplish at the agency level. Generally agencies can only 
act within the scope of their authority. At the federal level in the U.S., taking 
advice from a citizen’s group runs into the concerns of the Federal Advisory 
                                                            
199 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 54, at 44-45. 
200 Clearly there is also a role for our institutions of higher education in educating students with 
the skills necessary to bring people together and to communicate across boundaries. 
201 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (2010). 
202 Barbara Cosens, Water Dispute Resolution in the West: Process Elements for the Modern 
Era in Basin-wide Problem Solving, 33 ENVTL. L. 949, 1014 (2003). 
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Committee Act,203 passed to assure that federal agency decision making is 
accountable. The development of political commissions204 at the scale of the 
social-ecological system, rather than agency advisory groups, can provide a 
politically accountable body that can respond to public input. 
It is also difficult to imagine “meaningful public participation” at the scale of 
a river basin the size of the Columbia. The term used in symposium discussions to 
describe a manageable process of this magnitude was “nested” public input. The 
author has written about this in the context of state-federal-tribal negotiations 
concerning water and divided the interests into three concentric circles: those with 
direct interest in water; basin communities; and the public at-large.205 In the case of 
the Columbia River basin, as is appropriate in negotiation of an international 
treaty, those actually at the table must be federal level representatives (i.e., for 
negotiation of an international treaty: the United States, the State Department; for 
Canada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade). However, the three areas of 
concentric circles correspond to: (1) direct water interests: states, province, Native 
American Tribes, First Nations; (2) basin communities: the broader range of 
interests represented by the Columbia Basin Trust and the sub-basin planning 
process of the NWPCC; and (3) the public-at-large: fishing and hydropower 
interests outside the basin. Given this degree of organization within the basin, each 
level has an existing structure that can be used to develop input. This approach 
does not mean that every concern or proposal from the public will be used. In fact, 
the purpose of representation by an entity at each level is to have decision makers 
who can reconcile differences and choose between competing interests. While 
consensus is a laudable goal, with issues as complex as water management 
requiring hard choices and tradeoffs, consensus is an unlikely result.206 
Local capacity building: The ability to respond to changed circumstances in 
a social-ecological system, similar to the ability to respond to an emergency, 
requires an infusion of resources at the local level. Although it is often said that a 
                                                            
203 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), as amended 
by Pub. L. 94-409, § 5(C), 90 Stat. 1247; Pub. L. 96-523, § 2, 94 Stat. 3040 (1980); Pub. L. 97-375, 
Title II, §201(C), 96 Stat. 1822 (1982); Pub. L. 105-153, §2(A), (B), 111 Stat. 2689 (1997). 
204 Craig Thomas, The Impact of Institutional Design on the Adaptability of Governing 
Institutions: Implications for Transboundary River Governance, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra 
note 67 (draft article at 17, on file with author). 
205 Cosens, supra note 202, at 947. 
206 See, e.g., Zellmer & Gunderson, supra  note 50, at 942 
 
One of the key lessons learned from both the Everglades and the Glen Canyon Dam 
restoration projects is that “providing ad hoc, vague directives for experimental, 
collaborative regulatory processes invites delay and indecision to the detriment of those 
resources harmed by inaction.”. . .  Although collaborative stakeholder groups can 
provide guidance to restoration scientists and managers “about the kinds of issues to 
study and the kinds of risks that are acceptable in formulating and conducting adaptive 
management experiments,” restoration plans, to be successful, must be unfettered from 
rigid consensus building requirements and free to experiment “without constant 
micromanagement.”  
 
(internal citations omitted). 
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million individual actions can be more effective than a single large governmental 
response,207 it is amazing how quickly we turn to a higher level of government 
when a problem occurs. Yet it is on the local level, not the level of an entity like 
the Department of Homeland Security, that a major portion of the resources are 
needed for response to events like Hurricane Katrina, 9-11, or the 1948 Vanport 
flood.208 This capacity to respond quickly in a manner that can be instantly tailored 
to the nature of the event is both more intuitive and thus easier to sell to the public, 
when the topic is a natural disaster with high potential for property damage and 
loss of life. Yet even so, we often lack the necessary resources at the local level.209 
Thus, it is not difficult to understand that when local action is needed to address a 
problem that manifests over a period of time, in a different location, the political 
will to fund the problem is lacking. 
The Columbia River Treaty provides a lesson in how to address the problem 
of local capacity. Why would Canada build dams in its territory for the benefit of 
power production in the United States? The concept of the Canadian Entitlement 
for the sharing of benefits across the international boundaries, and the thirty-year 
initial sale of the entitlement provided the necessary incentive. As Vogel points out 
in her contribution to the forthcoming Columbia Symposium volume, the 
formation of the international treaty allowed the basin to develop as a region.210 It 
is on this scale that benefits of local action must be distributed. 
Authority to respond to changes in circumstances across a range of 
scenarios: The separate work of Greg Hill and Craig Thomas presented at the 
Symposium provide an excellent framework for understanding the needs of 
governance in the face of uncertainty. Both suggest that while existing frameworks 
for agency management are appropriate for management and adaptive management 
in the face of predictable variability, the existing framework may not be 
appropriate for response in a complex system in which uncertainty is “not 
reducible by further research,”211 or, in the framework of Thomas, to “wicked” 
problems in which the actors are unable to agree on either the problem definition 
or the solution.212 Both presenters agreed that a new form of governance is needed 
                                                            
207 “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. 
Indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.” Margaret Mead, as quoted in AND I QUOTE: THE DEFINITIVE 
COLLECTION OF QUOTES, SAYINGS, AND JOKES FOR THE CONTEMPORARY SPEECHMAKER (Ashton 
Applewhite et al. eds., 1992). 
208 It should be noted that a coordinated effort at a high level may be exactly the response 
needed to reduce uncertainty (e.g. Homeland Security may allow the U.S. to reduce the possibility of 
another terrorist attack), however, in areas like climate change and terrorism where uncertainty can 
never be reduced to zero, a robust local and multi-level response capability is necessary. 
209 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT 13 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt. 
edu/911/report/index.htm (“Despite weaknesses in preparations for disaster, failure to achieve unified 
incident command, and inadequate communications among responding agencies . . .”). 
210 See generally Vogel, supra note 193. 
211 Gregory Hill et al., Uncertainty Society and Resilience: A Case Study in the Columbia River 
Basin, in COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 67 (draft article at 20, on file with author). 
212 Thomas, supra note 204, at 171. 
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in this complex situation. Thomas recommended politically appointed councils,213 
while Hill called for a more general framework in which an extended peer 
community continually assesses knowledge and is coupled with a “robust system 
for managing and communicating uncertainty.”214 Both approaches differ from 
current agency adaptive management by allowing decision-making outside the 
current legislative framework while maintaining a degree of accountability through 
a political or peer selection process. This seems strikingly similar to the description 
of adaptive governance in the resilience literature.215 
An example is Montana’s process for achieving settlements concerning the 
water rights of Native American and federal reservations within the state. Unlike 
the federal government or other states that designate agency personnel to represent 
their government in negotiations,216 Montana relies on a politically appointed 
commission217 with the authority to coordinate positions among state agencies218 
and private stakeholders, and to make final decisions among conflicting positions. 
Final settlements are submitted to the legislature219 to provide an additional level 
of political accountability, to assure state citizens are bound, and to authorize any 
state agency action outside its existing authority. Not only does this provide an 
entity with the flexibility to respond differently to different circumstances, but in 
practice it has achieved support for its final settlement in the legislature by viewing 
its primary functions as the coordination of the two-way flow of information 
among agencies and between agencies and the public, and the design of creative 
                                                            
213 Id. 
214 Hill et al., supra note 211, at 21. 
215 See generally Folke et al., supra note 44. 
216 See Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations 
for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990). 
217 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-701 (West 2009) (“it is further intended that the state of Montana 
proceed under the provisions of this part in an effort to conclude compacts for the equitable division 
and apportionment of waters between the state and its people and the several Indian tribes claiming 
reserved water rights within the state.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (West 2009)  (“(2) Subject to 
5-5-234, commissioners are appointed as follows: (a) two members of the house of representatives 
appointed by the speaker, one from the majority party and one from the minority party; (b) two 
members of the senate appointed by the president, one from the majority party and one from the 
minority party; (c) four members designated by the governor; and (d) one member designated by the 
attorney general.”). See also Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, 
http://dnrc.mt.gov/rwrcc/default.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).  
218 Memorandum of Understanding among: The Office of Governor, The Office of the Attorney 
General, The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, The Office of the Director of 
Natural Resources and Conservation, and The Office of the Director of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 
Concerning: The Negotiation of Settlements with Tribes and Federal Agencies Claiming Reserved 
Water in Montana (Feb. 2, 1990) (on file with author). 
219 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702(2) (West 2009) 
 
When the compact commission and the Indian tribes or their authorized representatives 
have agreed to a compact, they shall sign a copy and file an original copy with the 
department of state of the United States of America and copies with the secretary of state 
of Montana and with the governing body for the tribe involved. The compact is effective 
and binding upon all parties upon ratification by the legislature of Montana and any 
affected tribal governing body, and approval by the appropriate federal authority. 
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solutions to resolve any resulting conflicts. In the author’s experience as a 
negotiator for the Commission,220 the entity rarely had to choose between 
competing positions. The mere existence of that authority, backed by its standing 
with the legislature due to its legislator participants, combined with the effort to 
ensure that interests at all levels held the same information, made it unnecessary to 
wield a heavy hand. Instead, the Commission and its staff performed the roles of 
maven, connector and entrepreneurial leader. The Commission may provide a 
useful approach to the coordination of solutions to wicked problems. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Fostering resilience in social-ecological systems is a choice that we, as a 
democratic society, can make if we desire to continue to receive the massive 
benefits of the ecosystems we rely on. It is not the path we are currently on as 
reflected in our administrative framework, our substantive natural resource law, 
and specifically, our management of the Columbia River. Should we choose 
resilience, restructuring the current system is no small task. This paper looks 
primarily at the administrative framework that must change from the model of 
massive state and federal agencies taking a command and control approach to an 
infusion of resources and capacity building at the local level, while retaining 
overlapping state, federal and international programs to provide oversight and 
research and to coordinate across multiple jurisdictions. Such reform will require 
authorization for greater flexibility in decision-making while relying on public 
participation and input as a large source of accountability. It will require 
expenditures on monitoring the effects of decisions and the flexibility to respond to 
the results of monitoring. In short, the recognition of the complexity in the social-
ecological system, coupled with our growing realization of the complete 
dependence of the human race on the ability of the ecological system to serve it, 
requires reform of the administrative state to allow us, as a responsible society, to 
respond to the challenge of managing multi-jurisdictional watersheds.  
                                                            
220 The author served as lead negotiator for the Commission in negotiations achieving 
settlement of the water rights of: the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation, 
Yellowstone National Park, Glacier National Park, Big Hole National Battlefield, Little Bighorn 
Battlefield National Battlefield, Bighorn Canyon National Recreation Area, Red Rock Lakes National 
Wildlife Refuge, Black Coulee National Wildlife Refuge, and Benton Lake National Wildlife Refuge. 
